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Experienced and Novice Investors:  






This paper examines the effect of environmental information on the in-
vestment decisions of investors. The motivation for the experimental de-
s i g n  a p p l i e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  i s  t h a t  u n l e s s  a c t u a l  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  i s  o b -
served, the potential usefulness of environmental information (or lack 
thereof) cannot be taken for granted. The study is based on an experi-
ment where groups of investors (varied by experience) were asked to 
make investment allocation decisions based on financial information and 
on supplementary environmental information (varied between cases). As 
an investment allocation decision (varied by investment horizons) the 
groups were asked to allocate funds to two companies based on the avail-
able information. The findings suggest that environmental information has 
the potential to influence investment allocation decisions. The findings 
also suggest that the influence of environmental information on invest-
ment allocation decisions is mitigated by the variables considered expli-
citly in this study, i.e., the investment horizon (varied as short and long) 
and investor experience (varied as novice and experienced investor). It is 
concluded that because allocation decisions are multifaceted problems, 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the present study is to shed light on the value creation poten-
tial of environmental reporting by introducing a controlled experimental 
setting for investment allocation decision making when faced with varying 
amounts of environmental information. Recent research suggests that 
motivations for corporate environmental disclosure are plentiful (O’ Dwyer 
et al. 2005b; Cormier et al. 2005; Solomon & Lewis 2002; Moneva et al. 
2000). Cormier et al. (2005) propose that the potential costs of environ-
mental disclosure for a company should be understood in light of the 
benefits to society. Variations in disclosure policy are found to be contex-
tually based on such factors as risk, ownership, fixed assets age and firm 
size (Cormier et al. 2005, p. 32). Hassel et al. (2005) examine the value 
relevance of environmental performance and find that companies rated 
highly in terms of environmental performance are not, ceteris paribus, 
highly valued by investors. They suggest that the explanation might be a 
“cost concern”, which is an explanation at odds with other studies favour-
ing a value creation explanation (Hassel et al. 2005, p.56). “Value crea-
tion” is based on the assumptions that good environmental performance 
creates value and that environmental disclosures are actually rewarded by 
decision makers and seen as sufficiently significant to be included as deci-
sion criteria. Some evidence seems to indicate that investors see envi-
ronmental performance as more important today than earlier, judging 
from e.g. the emergence of sustainable investment funds and sustainable   4
investment methods (Koellner et al. 2005; CMA 2005; Earl & Clift 1999), 
the emergence of investment related indexes such as the Dow Jones In-
dex for Sustainable Development
1, attention of accounting standard set-
ters to environmental performance (Internal Auditor 2006) and the linking 
of environmental management with creation of long term corporate value 
(Figge 2005).  
 
An often debated issue is the actual importance of environmental and so-
cial information to investor decision making. One element of this debate is 
whether investors get all the information they need about the environ-
mental performance of the company to make informed investment deci-
sions (Lydenberg 2005; CMA 2005; Lee & Hutchison 2005; IRRC 2004; 
IRRC 1992). This information deficiency argument has been used to de-
mand increased disclosures of environmental information by companies 
(Araya 2003). This is based on the assumptions that good environmental 
performance is actually rewarded and reduces business risks and that in-
vestors find this reward improvement/risk reduction significant enough to 
include it as a decision criterion. But is that the case? This is the question 
that is examined in this paper. The motivation for the experimental design 
applied in this study is that unless actual decision making is observed in-
stead of indirect measures, e.g. eliciting opinions of self-assessed decision 
usefulness, the potential usefulness of environmental information (or lack 
thereof) cannot be taken for granted. 
                                            
1 http://www.sustainability-indexes.com/. Accessed 25-05-2006.   5
 
The study is based on an experiment where groups of investors (varied by 
experience) were asked to make investment allocation decisions based on 
financial information and on supplementary environmental information 
(varied between cases). As an investment allocation decision (varied by 
investment horizons) the groups were asked to assign funds to the two 
companies based on the available information. The difference between the 
groups was then measured to elicit how environmental information af-
fected the decision making. The investors were also asked to rate the de-
cision relevance of the different types of information presented in the in-
formation material supplied to them.   
 
The findings presented in this study suggest that environmental informa-
tion has the potential to influence investment allocation decisions. The 
findings also suggest that the influence of environmental information on 
investment allocation decisions is mitigated by the variables considered 
explicitly in this study, i.e., the investment horizon (varied as short and 
long) and investor experience (varied as novice and experienced inves-
tor)
2. It is concluded that because allocation decisions are multifaceted 
problems, mixed results related to the influence of environmental infor-
mation should be expected. 
                                            
2 A paper based on another set of findings collected in this study has been accepted for 
publication in Business Strategy and the Environment. These findings relate to the effect 
of different types of environmental disclosures (i.e., qualitative vs. quantitative) on in-
vestment allocation decisions among the group of novice investors (students). 
   6
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses environ-
mental disclosures and investments including several prior studies in this 
area. Section 3 describes the methodology of the study. Section 4 pre-
sents the results of the study and section 5 concludes on the findings.   
 
2. Social and Environmental Disclosures and Decision Making 
 
This section is subdivided into two sections. In the first section we present 
and discuss the practice of environmental disclosures by companies in-
cluding various theoretical explanations and characteristics of current dis-
closing practice. In the second section we look at prior studies in relation 
to the methodologies used in examining the effects of environmental dis-
closures. 
 
2.1 Explaining the Need for Environmental Disclosures 
Several frameworks have been proposed for analyzing corporate disclo-
sures to external decision makers. One framework, based in part on Ar-
nold & Sutton (1997), is presented in figure 1. The basic premise of this 
framework is that the use of accounting information – including corporate 
environmental and social performance information – occurs through indi-
viduals and/or groups fulfilling institutionally embedded roles. These indi-
viduals and groups belong to a specific company, a specific NGO or a spe-  7
cific investor community and their interactions are therefore conditional 
upon these institutional contexts and the related contextual factors.  
 
>Insert Figure 1: Disclosing Decision Relevant Information <  
 
Disclosure, in our context, is represented by the authorized public release 
of corporate environmental and social performance information and the 
processes leading up to this event. In the current study this means a 
separate report or information section containing information about this 
performance aspect of the company. The use of this information is repre-
sented by the use of environmental and social information to support 
economic, political or social processes such as decision making by inves-
tors or in government policy. In the current study it means the use of en-
vironmental information by economic actors – i.e., investors – to arrive at 
a particular investment decision.  
 
The framework also separates the effects of environmental disclosures 
from disclosure practices and uses. These effects could include e.g. 
changes in share price, improved quality of the environment or changes in 
some user preferences (see later). 
 
Focusing on environmental disclosure processes and practices in figure 1, 
there is no overview available of the number of companies worldwide that 
disclose their social and environmental performance. Rikhardsson (1997)   8
estimated that in 1996 there were approximately 1000 companies report-
ing on their social environmental performance through free-standing re-
ports either voluntarily or within the European Union Environmental Man-
agement and Auditing Scheme (EMAS). Today, recent surveys of envi-
ronmental reporting practices in various countries and industries as well 
as new environmental reporting legislations in various countries would in-
dicate that this number is significantly higher (Llena et al. 2006; Stanwick 
& Stanwick 2006; KPMG 2005; Freedman & Jaggi 2005; Business in the 
Environment 2004; Thompson & Zakaria 2004; Rikhardsson et al. 2002, 
Krut & Moretz 2000). In Denmark and in the Netherlands approximately 
1000 and 300 companies respectively produce mandatory free-standing 
environmental reports and currently there are approximately 4600 EMAS 
certified sites required to produce an EMAS environmental statement
3. 
Norway and Sweden have implemented legal requirements for environ-
mental reporting that although not as far reaching as those in Denmark 
and the Netherlands, oblige companies to include certain disclosures in 
corporate annual reports (Nyquist 2003; Perrini 2005). Judging from the 
surveys cited above as well as dedicated websites such as those of 
GreenBiz
4, there is also a significant level of voluntary social and envi-
ronmental reporting. Conservatively, the total number of obligatory and 
voluntary free-standing social and environmental reports being produced 
worldwide might thus be in the range of 8,000 – 10,000 reports. Some 
sources (Osborne 2005) estimate that the total number of companies dis-
                                            
3 http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/emas. /index_en.htm. Accessed 25-05-2006.   9
closing some sort of environmental information might be around 85,000. 
It should be noted that although this is not a significant part of all regis-
tered companies worldwide, this number includes some of the world’s 
largest companies that have significant impact on national and global 
economic, social and environmental developments. 
 
Some companies have to comply with environmental reporting legislation, 
but why do companies voluntarily report on their environmental and so-
cial performance? Different theories have been used to explain this, for 
instance legitimacy theory (Mobus 2005; Freedmann & Patten 2004; 
Wilmhurst & Frost 2000; Patten 1992), stakeholder management theory 
(O’Dwyer et al. 2005a; Cormier et al. 2004; Collison et al. 2003; Clarkson 
1995) and corporate marketing and communication theory (Hasseldine et 
al. 2005; Hooghiemstra 2000). However, the framework applied in the 
present study is the “decision usefulness” explanation based on an agency 
theory framework. This framework is based on the assumption that users 
of information assign usefulness criteria to the information disclosed to 
them: the more useful the information, the higher the value placed on the 
information (see Healy & Palepu 2001 for a review of empirical disclosure 
literature). In the context of environmental disclosures, environmental re-
porting is conducted because various stakeholders require additional in-
formation for their decisions different to that available in financial reports 
and other company communication (Power 1991).  
                                                                                                                                   
4 http://www.greenbiz.com. Accessed 20/5 2006.    10
 
2.2 Different Methodologies in Prior Studies for Assessing the Effects of 
Social and Environmental Disclosures  
Two main types of methodologies have been applied in the literature, fo-
cusing on the use and impact of the disclosed information as shown in 
figure 1. One type includes the market reaction studies or capital market 
studies where the reaction of investors is measured by evaluating stock 
market variables (e.g. price or risk) in connection with social and envi-
ronmental performance disclosures (for an overview see e.g. Margolis & 
Walsh 2001; Mathews 1996; Ullmann 1985). These studies focus on as-
sessing the overall market reaction to disclosures of social and environ-
mental performance information, measured by changes in stock price, in-
vestment levels, risk assessment etc. The results of these studies are 
contradictory (e.g. Hassel et al. 2005). Some have documented a positive 
relationship between disclosures and the measured variables – i.e., more 
(positive) disclosures are associated with positive reactions from the mar-
ket (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2003; Anderson & Frankle 1980, Belkaoui 1976, 
Preston 1978). Others have documented no market reaction to these 
types of disclosures (Murray et al. 2006; Freedman & Jaggi 1982) or even 
found signs of a negative market reaction (Hassel et al. 2005; Ingram & 
Frazier 1983). 
 
Capital market studies differ regarding the variables tested, companies 
examined, time periods focused on and contextual influences during these   11
periods. This might be one reason why there is no definite conclusion re-
garding the effect of social and environmental performance disclosures to 
investors, nor the direction of the effect. However, judging from the 
above studies, environmental and social disclosures may affect user be-
haviour in some situations.  
 
The other type of research methodology that has been applied to study 
effects of social and environmental disclosures is survey based decision 
experiments, i.e. the focus is on the person who is actually deciding on 
investment in the company in question, based on what information this 
person has regarding the investment choice.  
 
Hendricks (1976) and Belkaoui (1980) are examples of early studies em-
ploying this methodology. Hendricks’ experiment focused on human re-
source accounting and showed that stock investment decisions were af-
fected by the inclusion of this information in conventional accounting in-
formation. Belkaoui investigated whether the investment decision by an 
external user would be different if pollution abatement costs were dis-
closed and whether decisions would vary depending on the occupation of 
the decision maker.  Generally, the results showed that the various ac-
counting treatments for pollution control information had an effect on in-
vestment decisions. Previous experience and occupation group of the de-
cision maker seemed to influence the use and effect of disclosures. The 
effect was most significant with bankers and in some cases accountants   12
whereas students did not perceive the importance of the pollution abate-
ment cost information at all.  
 
Another experiment study is reported in Milne & Chan (1999) and Chan & 
Milne (1999). They assessed the decision behaviour of financial analysis 
(investment analysts and accountants) when presented with information 
packages with and without voluntary narrative social disclosures. Using 
control groups their main conclusion was that narrative social perform-
ance information does not have an impact on short term investment 
strategies but has some significance for longer term investment strate-
gies.  
 
Although the evidence from these studies is somewhat inconclusive, there 
is reason to believe that individual investors, in some cases anyway, value 
supplementary information positively and reward the companies that dis-
close this type of information, at least when it comes to long term in-
vestments. Furthermore, there seems to be a difference between varying 
levels of experience where professionals decide differently from e.g. stu-
dents.  
 
The study reported in the following focuses on the use and analysis of en-
vironmental information. The basic aim is to assess the actual importance 
of environmental information for investment allocation investment deci-  13
sions given different investment horizons as well as different education 
and experience levels of investors.   
 
3. The Methodology of the Study 
 
In this section we present the methodology adopted in this study. The me-
thodology is that of an experimental design: as in most experiments this 
means that some of the experimental subjects were influenced in some way 
while other subjects were not. How this design is reflected in our study is 
described below. In the first subsection, the basic experimental manipula-
tion is introduced. The second subsection presents the content of the ap-
plied research instrument, and in the third subsection the processes of sub-
ject selection and randomization are disclosed in more detail. In the last 
subsection, the hypotheses development and operational measurements 
are described. 
 
3.1 The Basic Experimental Manipulation 
Designing an experiment is based on choices which can impact both meas-
urement and interpretability. The first choice is that the participant neces-
sarily must be unaware of the “manipulation”, i.e., the fact that the in-
formation content of the assigned cases is not identical. Therefore, a be-
tween-subjects design (see e.g. Field & Hole 2002 for a definition) was 
chosen, so as that even the possibility of learning effects resulting from 
task repetition was eliminated. The method was chosen even though a   14
somewhat common misconception about experimentation is that people 
are manipulated. This however has nothing to do with the nature of ex-
periments. Kerlinger (1979, 84) states: “Manipulation in experiments 
simply and always means doing different things to different groups; the 
manipulation reflects one or more independent variables”. The research 
instrument was designed in two versions (see below), thus allowing two 
levels of the independent variable representing environmental informa-
tion.  
 
The second choice was to include a within-subjects (Field & Hole 2002) 
variable in order to be able to measure potential decision differences re-
lated to short term vs. long term investment horizons. Finally, a choice 
was made to examine potential differences between levels of experience 
in relation to investment decisions. In this paper, we report on differences 
dividing the subjects into two main categories, i.e., into relatively inexpe-
rienced “novices” vs. experienced investment decision makers termed “in-
vestors”. This allows us to measure differences in the information proc-
essing on the basis of experience with investment allocation decision 
making. 
 
3.2 The Research Instrument 
The research instrument was constructed so as to provide a reasonably 
realistic basis for an investment allocation decision. The instrument was 
divided into two parts:    15
 
Part A: A several pages long description of two companies between which 
a predetermined sum of money had to be divided (i.e., the investment al-
location decision). 
 
Part B: A questionnaire with three elements 
1) Background information on the participating subjects 
2) The investment allocation decision – both long term and short term 
3) Debriefing questions on the relative importance of different parts of 
the information provided, questions on the use of financial and non-
financial information for decision making in general and validation 
questions on the sufficiency of the information provided for the ac-
tual investment allocation decision. 
 
Part A was developed based on information provided by two actual com-
panies in their quarterly reports. The identity of the companies was dis-
guised so as to prevent any prior knowledge of the companies impacting 
the final investment allocation decisions. The disguise consisted of both 
changing financial data and company background. The financial data were 
changed into other levels while still maintaining the original relationships. 
The industry and the company background were also changed in order to 
hinder such prior knowledge effects. No effort was made to calibrate the 
information to make the companies equally desirable. The control group   16
in the experiment (see later) was intended to provide information on such 
potential differences in the relative desirability of the two companies.  
 
The information content of the descriptions was similar for each of the 
two companies to be assessed for the investment allocation decision, 
namely: 
 
1.  Summary information traditionally found at the beginning of most 
company quarterly reports 
2.  Main financial figures and ratios year to date for the first three 
quarters of the year (i.e., a nine month overview)  
3.  Discussion of accounting aspects 
4.  Revenue developments in the period 
5.  Investment descriptions and information for the reporting year  
6.  Environmental issues such as environmental management systems 
and environmental performance (if included – see table 1)  
7.  Currency developments and risks 
8.  Expectations for the future 
9.  Five year comparison of main financial figures and ratios. 
 
In part B there were several questions aimed at capturing background 
variables such as age, gender, education and experience. Also included 
were questions (a five point Likert scale) regarding the overall value 
placed by the respondent on different supplementary information types   17
regarding investment decisions, both short and long term. The supple-
mentary information asked about was related to social reports, environ-
mental reports, intellectual capital reports, ethical statements, Health & 
Safety reports and value reports. Part B also included several questions 
aimed at assessing the sufficiency of the information material for the in-
vestment decision.   
 
Based on the set of financial and non-financial information, the manipula-
tions in the experimental design were set up as described in table 1. The 
motivation for the design was that unless actual decision making was ob-
served, the potential usefulness of environmental information (or lack 
thereof) should not be taken for granted. Thus each subject had to make 
an investment allocation decision by assigning an amount to company Al-
pha and to another company named either Beta (no environmental infor-
mation) or Gamma (with environmental information). The manipulation of 
information content was provided by cues adding both qualitative and 
quantitative information on environmental issues as the difference be-
tween Beta and Gamma. All other information in Beta and Gamma was 
the same. It should be noted that the environmental information was pre-
sented and calibrated to show an overall positive environmental perform-
ance over a 5 year period. As such it included information that is tradi-
tionally disclosed by companies (Rikhardsson et al. 2002) regarding their 
environmental management systems, commitment to the environment 
and performance indicators such as energy efficiency, waste generation   18
and compliance status. The conscious choice for the direction of the in-
formation was made in order to examine the possible value of environ-
mental information in a context free of negative connotations. The argu-
ment was that a negative direction (bad news scenario) could have cre-
ated possible demand effects in the case material. The direction of the in-
formation was validated by 5 external persons with expertise in environ-
mental reporting, i.e., confirming the direction as being primarily positive. 
 
>Insert Table 1: Manipulation in the Research Design. < 
 
The research instrument was designed and tested in several stages to 
minimize participation fatigue due to the time needed to complete the 
questionnaire and to secure the best possible level of realism of the in-
vestment allocation decision. Before administering the final version of the 
research instrument, a pilot test was run on a group of potential subjects 
to validate the design.  
 
3.3 Subject Selection and Randomization 
A process of random assignment of case versions was initiated to avoid sys-
tematic errors and secure replicability. In effect, one of the great strengths 
of experiments is that randomization can be used. Kerlinger (1979, p. 92) 
even argues that “it is the only defensible method invented to increase the 
probability of the validity of experiments and the inferences made from   19
them by increasing the probability of “equality” of experimental groups in 
all possible independent variables”. 
 
In choosing the subjects for this experiment, the experience level was to a 
certain degree used as a selection criterion. One of the requirements of the 
case material was that the participants had to possess prior knowledge of 
interpreting financial and non-financial business reports. Hence, two groups 
of subjects were approached. The group of subjects termed “novices” was 
graduate business students. Generally they are characterized by having 
an understanding of corporate communication requirements and the 
availability of financial as well as non-financial information for investor 
decision making but no practical experience (Belkaoui 1980). The instru-
ment was administered at the end of a joint course in advanced financial 
accounting for finance graduates and management accounting graduates. 
Students are not relevant subjects (surrogates) for all empirical research 
areas, but for certain tasks involving information processing and decision 
making, college students make decisions that approximate those made by 
the rest of the general population (see Ashton and Kramer 1980). Using 
students to study behaviour in experiments is widespread in business 
studies (Gordon et al. 1986; Kagel & Levin 2001; Gillette et al 2003; Dilla 
& Steinbart 2005). Here we used graduate business students as a bench-
mark (termed novices) in order to ferret out potential differences in dif-
ferent types of investors (i.e., investor groups). The other group of sub-
jects termed “investors”, was subjects characterized by having personal   20
experience with investment allocation decisions especially in the form of 
self-managed pension portfolios or in professional business contexts. The 
instrument for this group was administered at an investor meeting under 
the same type of conditions as for the other group. The investor group 
was more heterogeneous in terms of educational background and in level 
of theoretical insight related to financial and non-financial business reports.   
 
Hence, the hypotheses development (described below) reflects a research 
design which is a 2*2*2 experimental design with two levels of environ-
mental information, two different investment horizons and two different 
investor groups. This is summarized in table 2.  
 
>Insert Table 2: Overview of the Experimental Design for Investment Allo-
cation Decisions. < 
 
3.4 Hypotheses Development and Operational Measurements  
The research design allows the joint consideration of three sets of hy-
potheses, which are formalized in this section. The hypotheses may all be 
considered in relation to a single operational measure. As explained above 
the first company is the same in all investment allocation decisions, while 
the information is varied in relation to the second company (i.e., Beta or 
Gamma). Hence, the operational measurement of the investment alloca-
tion decision is best captured by looking at the proportion of the amount 
invested in the second company as compared to the total amount in-  21
vested. The investment allocation decision is set up such that DKK 50,000 
has to be divided between two companies. If DKK 20,000 is assigned to 
Alpha (company C1) and DKK 30,000 is assigned to Beta (company C21), 
the ratio will be 3 to 5 or 0.6. Accordingly, the operational measure will 
be a ratio which is comparable and allows us to test the hypotheses pre-
sented below. 
 
The Investment Horizon Hypothesis  
The first set of hypotheses reflects the consideration of possible differ-
ences in information use for short term and long term investment alloca-
tion decisions. Based on prior findings, there is no reason to expect that 
the information basis for short term investment allocation decisions 
should be the same as the information basis for long term decisions. In 
the present context a one year horizon was chosen as a relevant separa-
tion between short term and long term. The subjects were asked to allo-
cate the amount under two different investment strategies and register 
their decisions separately. The first investment decision was defined as 
short term with time spans up to 1 year while the other was defined as a 
long term investment decision with time spans from 1 to 5 years.  
 
The short term decision was intended to measure behaviour given more 
speculative profit motives while the other was intended to measure be-
haviour given long term share ownership. While different investor types 
arguably have different timeframes (private vs. professional investors,   22
day traders vs. venture capital investors etc.), the distinction between 
short term and long term was chosen to reflect the periodical manner in 
which environmental information is typically provided. 
 
Reduction of the uncertainty about the future earning power of a company 
may be based on a mix of the different informational items assessed by 
the investor. For the present investment allocation decision, the subjects 
might decide to rely on different factors depending on the investment ho-
rizon, and hence there would be no expectation of the direction of differ-
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The null hypothesis is stated as the following. 
 
H1: There is no difference between the relative amounts allocated 
to the second company (C2i, where i=1 is Beta and i=2 is Gamma) 
when comparing the long term (L) and short term (S) investment 
allocation decisions. 
 
An examination of the H1 hypothesis will provide insight into the value of 
the information processing of the investment allocation decision makers.   23
Further, it is possible to subdivide the hypothesis to examine whether en-
vironmental information will amplify or mitigate any directional effects 
caused by the investment horizon. Parallel to the reported findings by 
Milne & Chan (1999), companies that disclose environmental information 
may be rewarded, at least when it comes to long term investments.  
 
The Experience Hypothesis 
The second set of hypotheses considers possible differences in informa-
tion processing among different categories of investors. The benefit of 
making different types of information available may reflect that not all in-
formation is used (to the same extent) by all investment allocation deci-
sion makers. Hence, such differences are proxied by isolating two seem-
ingly homogenous groups and comparing their investment allocation deci-
sions. The absence of value of environmental information for making such 
decisions has been argued (i.e., the mixed findings presented in section 
2). If such an argument holds across different types of information proc-
essors, the argument becomes stronger. If, on the other hand, differences 
are found, then an argument could be made for the potential value of the 
information. Such an argument could be extended to include possible 
changes in information usefulness over time (i.e., differences in informa-
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The hypothesis is set up as the following null hypothesis.  
 
H2: There is no difference between the relative amounts allocated 
to the second company (C2i, where i=1 is Beta and i=2 is Gamma) 
when comparing novice (N) and experienced (E) investment alloca-
tion decision makers. 
 
An examination of the H2 hypothesis will provide insight into the value of 
the information processing of the investment allocation decision makers. 
Further, it is possible to subdivide the hypothesis to examine whether en-
vironmental information will amplify or mitigate any directional effects 
caused by the experience level of the investors.  
 
The Environmental Information Hypothesis 
If the information related to the environment is regarded as positive in-
formation which provides added value, then our expectation is that the 
investor will assign a relatively larger portion of the investment amount to 
the company when more environmental information is available. If we ex-
pect the environment information to be of no importance, the investment 
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Hence, the null hypothesis for the investment allocation decision is: 
 
H3: For the investment allocation decision there is no difference be-
tween the relative amounts allocated to the second company 
(where C21 is Beta and C22 is Gamma) reflecting the content of envi-
ronmental information. 
 
The operational measure for the information content variable is the rela-
tive amount invested in company two (the case manipulation). Hence, a 
positive relation would be measured as a directional effect of the envi-
ronmental information. The ratio of the amount invested in the second 
company in relation to the total investment would be higher for Gamma 
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When both investment horizon (t = S or L) and experience level (j = N, E 
or all subjects) are introduced as possible explanatory factors this hy-
pothesis could be subdivided into 6 separate hypotheses.  
   26
In the next section we present the findings regarding the testing of the 
hypotheses H1 to H3 as well as additional findings where the use and 




This section is divided into four subsections. First we present the subject 
group compositions and provide descriptive statistics for the investment 
allocation decisions. In the second subsection findings related to the three 
hypotheses are presented using General Linear Modelling (GLM) analyses 
on averaged decisions. In the third subsection we examine the individual 
investment allocation decisions using univariate analyses and present 
findings based on the subjects’ self-assessed use of information. Finally, 
the last subsection examines the subjects’ assessment of the sufficiency 
of the provided information in relation to the investment allocation deci-
sions, thus providing information in regard to a validation of the decision 
scenario provided in the case descriptions.  
 
4.1 Subject Group Compositions and Descriptive Statistics 
In total 98 participants completed the questionnaire with their investment 
allocation decisions and answers to questions regarding their use of in-
formation. The composition of the subjects is presented in table 3. The 
cross table indicates that the novice subjects for obvious reasons are 
younger on average than the experienced investors.    27
 
>Insert Table 3: Crosstabulation of Subjects Based on Age and Experi-
ence Group< 
 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the relative amount invested 
in the second company across investment horizon, experience groups and 
case manipulations (companies). Hence, the 98 subjects, which made 
both a long term and a short term investment decision, may be subdi-
vided into 35 investors and 63 novices, and into 50 subjects considering 
Beta as the second company (without environmental information) and 48 
subjects considering Gamma as the second company (with environmental 
information). 
 
>Insert Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Ratio Allocated to the Sec-
ond Company Across Investment Horizons, Experience Groups and Case 
Manipulations (Companies).< 
 
Initially, it could be noted that the subjects consistently prefer to invest a 
larger amount in Alpha than the second company (Beta or Gamma re-
spectively). This is not of further concern because the levels are not inter-
esting in themselves. We are looking at differences in relative amounts 
invested in the second company – i.e., the difference between Beta and 
Gamma.  
   28
According to the descriptive statistics in table 4, the direction of the inde-
pendent variable is confirmed across all cells. A larger relative amount is 
consistently allocated to the second company when this is Gamma (in-
cluding environmental information) than when this is Beta (without envi-
ronmental information). This is an initial validation of the positive direc-
tion of the new information provided in the Gamma case. Overall 32.5% 
is invested in Beta vs. 37.8% in Gamma in the long term. In the short 
term, an increase from 43.2% to 52.3% may be noted when comparing 
Beta and Gamma. The direction of the differences also holds for each of 
the subject groups identified in the study; however, as visually demon-
strated in figures 3 and 4, the relationships are not uniform.  
 
>Insert Figure 2: Means for Ratio Invested in Company Without (Beta) 
and With (Gamma) Environmental Information by Investors in Short Term 
and Long Term.< 
 
>Insert Figure 3: Means for Ratio Invested in Company Without (Beta) 
and With (Gamma) Environmental Information by Novices in Short Term 
and Long Term.<  
 
Figure 2 indicates that the experienced investors are more affected by the 
environmental information for the short term decision than for the long 
term decision. In comparison it should be noted that the parallel lines in 
figure 3 indicate that the novices are almost equally affected by the envi-  29
ronmental information for the two decisions, however at different levels. 
Hence, these initial observations suggest that some interaction effects 
might play a role in explaining the potential role of the environmental in-
formation provided to the subjects. In the next subsection we provide an 
examination of the potential main and interaction effects suggested by 
these observations. 
 
4.2 GLM Analyses on Averaged Decisions 
The investment allocation decision measures were analyzed in a 2*2*2 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with investment horizon (ratio second long 
term vs. ratio second short term) as a within-subject factor and company 
(Beta without environmental information vs. Gamma with environmental 
information) and experience group (investor vs. novice) as between sub-
jects factors. The GLM procedure available in SPSS was applied because 
of its flexibility in terms of model design and the availability of test op-
tions. The general limitation of the GLM procedure in terms of testing for 
simple effects (univariate analysis) is addressed in the next subsection.  
 
In order to compute a within-subjects effect, the applied GLM procedure 
transformed the within-subject variable into an averaged variable. The 
repeated measure in this instance is the individual subject’s long and 
short term ratio decisions respectively. This allows for a transformation of 
the original variables into single degree of freedom tests of the null hy-
pothesis. Because GLM does not have to average multiple single degree of   30
freedom tests to get an overall test of the effect, the assumptions about 
the correlations between the transformed variables being zero and the 
variances of the transformed variables being equal are not pertinent. Be-
cause there is only one degree of freedom for these effects, only the lin-
ear effect contrast is shown in table 5.  
 
>Insert Table 5: Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts (Long Term Vs. Short 
Term Decision).< 
 
>Insert Table 6: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Experience Group 
and Case Manipulation).< 
 
The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for the investment horizon 
measure, F(1, 94) = 9.197, p < .005, and no significant interaction be-
tween the time horizon and the case and experience group variables, see 
table 5. The implication of rejecting H1 is that the subjects make different 
decisions depending on the investment horizon. The absence of interac-
tion effects of the within-subjects measure indicates that this is a consis-
tent finding across experience groups and across case manipulations. Ac-
cordingly, it is appropriate to interpret any significant main effects in the 
between-subjects design, see table 6.  
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It should be noted that the univariate tests of the between-subjects ef-
fects are made on the transformed within-subjects variable called “aver-
age”.  The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for the experience 
group with F(1, 94) = 5.5, p = 0.021, thus rejecting H2. The ANOVA also 
yielded a seemingly marginal main effect for the case manipulation (H3) 
with F(1,94) = 3.8, p = 0.056. However, the latter effect should be con-
sidered to be stronger in light of the confirmed directional effect of the 
environmental information (the consistent, positive difference in the ratio 
measures, which suggests an added investment in Gamma as compared 
to Beta, see table 4 for descriptive statistics). Hence, the significance 
level of the one-sided test is actually half of the reported two-sided level, 
namely p = 0.028. The implications are that both between-subjects vari-
ables should be considered when trying to explain decision making behav-
iour. In relation to the averaged measure for the individual subject’s in-
vestment behaviour, the two between-subjects variables do not interact 
(i.e., the reported F-value for this interaction is 0.047, see table 6).  
 
Using the GLM analyses on the averaged measures, all three null hy-
potheses are rejected. The implications are that the second company is 
favoured more: for the short investment horizon, by the experienced in-
vestors and when environmental information is presented by the com-
pany. The findings further suggest that the results are not carried by in-
teraction effects. Hence, the measured influence of environmental infor-  32
mation is not exclusively tied to one of the experience groups and/or one 
of the investment horizons.  
 
In the next subsection, the separate allocation decisions are examined 
through univariate analyses. This changes the focus of the analysis from 
the decision behaviour to the individual decisions of the subjects. Hence 
the separate investment allocation decision becomes the unit of analysis.  
 
4.3 Univariate Analyses of Separate Investment Decisions 
This section is subdivided in accordance with the two investment alloca-
tion decisions made by each of the participants in the experiment. First 
we examine the short term investment allocation decisions and the infor-
mation use related to these. Second we repeat the analysis in relation to 
the long term decisions. 
 
Short Term Investment Allocation Decisions 
In this section we report on the findings of the univariate tests of the be-
tween-subjects effects when tested on the dependent variable for the 
short term decision (ratio second short). Initially it should be noted that 
the second company is favoured more in the short term (overall average 
of 47.7%) than in the long term (overall average of 35.1%), see table 4 
for descriptives. The average amount assigned to Beta in the short term   33
is 43.2%, while the amount assigned to Gamma is more than half the al-
located amount, namely 52.3%. 
 
In contrast to the averaged variable examined in the previous section, the 
ANOVA presented in table 7 did not yield a significant main effect for the 
experience group variable with F(1, 94) = 1.1, p = 0.290, hence suggest-
ing similar decision making by the two groups in the short term. The im-
portance of environmental information is confirmed by the marginal main 
effect for the case manipulation with F(1, 94), p = 0.080, which is signifi-
cant at the 5% level (p = 0.040) when interpreted as a one-sided direc-
tional test as suggested in the previous section. When comparing the two 
experience groups graphically (see figure 4), the investors seem to react 
more to the environmental information provided in the Gamma case, but 
as already stated the difference between the experience groups is not sig-
nificant.  
 
>Insert Table 7: ANOVA with Short Term Decision Measured by Ratio 
Second Short as Dependent Variable.< 
 
>Insert Figure 4: Means for Short Term Ratio Invested in Company With-
out (Beta) and With (Gamma) Environmental Information by Experience 
Group.< 
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The subjects were also prompted for an assessment of the relative impor-
tance of various sources of information for the short term decisions. 
Hence, the subjects were asked to value the information contained in the 
headlines of the company descriptions. Table 8 provides descriptive sta-
tistics for each of the information categories, valued on a five point Likert-
scale with 1 as not important and 5 as very important.  
 
>Insert Table 8: Importance of Information Sources for Short Term Deci-
sions by Experience Group.< 
 
As can be seen in table 8, the information sources most highly valued for 
the short term decision are the nine month overview, revenue and income 
information together with management expectations. Independent sam-
ples t-tests on the differences between investors and novices suggest a 
high level of agreement, i.e., non-significant differences on 6 of 9 infor-
mation sources, see table 8, last column. It is noticeable that the largest 
(significant) differences include information on employees, management 
expectations and environmental information. For the three information 
sources, the investors placer higher value on these in terms of importance 
than the novices. In relation to the importance of the environmental in-
formation this is especially interesting because this self-assessed impor-
tance does not translate to a difference between the experience groups in 
relation to the actual short term investment allocation decision, see 
above.    35
Long Term Investment Allocation Decisions  
In this section we report on the findings of the univariate tests of the be-
tween-subjects effects when tested on the dependent variable for the long 
term decision (ratio second long). The ANOVA presented in table 9 yield a 
significant main effect for the experience group variable with F(1, 94) = 
6.4, p = 0.013. This is in accordance with the finding for the averaged 
variable, hence suggesting that the difference in decision making by the 
two groups is related to the long term decision (in contrast to the absence 
of this phenomenon in the short term).  
 
>Insert Table 9. ANOVA With Long Term Decision Measured by Ratio Sec-
ond Long as Dependent Variable.< 
 
>Insert Figure 5: Means for Long Term Ratio Invested in Company With-
out (Beta) and With (Gamma) Environmental Information by Experience 
Group.< 
 
The importance of environmental information is not confirmed by the 
ANOVA presented in table 9. Actually, the main effect of the case manipu-
lation is F(1, 94) = 1.1, p = 0.305 (0.153 as one-sided directional test). 
The interaction effect of case and experience group is not significant ei-
ther. When examining the two experience groups separately, it is clear 
that the novices react more to the environmental information in the long 
term than the investors. The differences are demonstrated graphically in 
figure 5. Although not reported in separate tables it can be noted that the   36
significance levels obtained from directional tests on the two separate 
groups are p = 0.06 for novices and p = 0.423 for investors, hence illus-
trating the non-significant, but still somewhat larger importance assigned 
to the environmental information in the long term by the novices.  
 
The subjects were also prompted for an assessment of the relative impor-
tance of various sources of information regarding long term investments, 
see table 10.  
 
>Insert Table 10: Importance of Information Sources for Long Term Deci-
sions by Experience Group. < 
 
As can be seen in table 10, the information most highly valued for the 
long term decision is the information on income, on investment level, the 
five year comparative figures and on information on management expec-
tations for future periods. The findings from the independent samples t-
tests suggest that only one information source is considered significantly 
different in importance at the 1% level, namely the information on in-
vestment level, which is assigned a higher value by the novices in relation 
to the long term decision, see table 10, last column. It is noticeable that 
the direction of the differences suggests that the investors value most of 
the information sources more than the novices (except information on in-
vestment and management expectations). In relation to the self-assessed 
importance on environmental information, both experience groups assess   37
this information as neutral (means around 3 for both groups) and this in-
dication is consistent with the absence of informational impact on the ac-
tual long term decisions as reported above. 
 
4.4 Validation of the Research Instrument 
The subjects were also asked whether the information provided in the 
company descriptions was sufficient. The sufficiency was measured on a 
five point Likert scale with 1 as completely insufficient and 5 as com-
pletely sufficient. According to the findings provided in table 11, both in-
vestors and novices indicate that the amount of information on the differ-
ent issues was sufficient (above 3 for most types).  
 
> Insert Table 11: Means for Importance and Sufficiency of Information 
Sources for Investment Allocation Decisions. < 
 
Table 11 is broken up in accordance with the case manipulations. It is 
highly noticeable that the information provided in the company descrip-
tions is assessed differently when comparing the Alpha-Beta investment 
allocation decision with the Alpha-Gamma decision. The assessment of 
sufficiency is higher for investors and novices when provided with the Al-
pha-Gamma material where more environmental information is available. 
In total, these findings provide a validation on the research instrument 
regarding the information content of the company descriptions provided 
as a basis for the investment allocation decisions.   38
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The findings presented in the previous section suggest that environmental 
information has the potential to influence investment allocation decisions.  
The motivation for the experimental design applied in this study is that 
unless actual decision making is observed instead of indirect measures, 
e.g. eliciting opinions of self-assessed decision usefulness, the potential 
usefulness of environmental information (or lack thereof) should not be 
taken for granted. Whether environmental information in itself is creates 
value or is indicative of cost consumption by the company, is a contextual 
question. The findings in the study suggest that the interpretation is also 
dependent on the eye of the beholder – here the investor.  
 
The 2*2*2 experimental design was tested using GLM analyses on the 
averaged measures, hence testing H1 to H3 at the subject level. All three 
null hypotheses were rejected. The implications in relation to the particu-
lar investment allocation decision are that the second company was fa-
voured more: for the short investment horizon, by the experienced inves-
tors and when environmental information was presented by the company. 
The findings further suggest that the results are not carried by interaction 
effects. Hence, the measured influence of environmental information is 
not exclusively tied to one of the experience groups and/or one of the in-
vestment horizons.    39
 
When the unit of analysis was shifted from the subject to the individual 
decision, the finding on influence from environmental information is con-
sistent across experience groups for the short term investment allocation 
decision. Both groups seem to react to the environmental information of-
fered in the scenario; the experienced investors a bit – but not signifi-
cantly – more. This is indicated by the absence of an interaction effect be-
tween the two between-subjects variables examined in the study. 
 
When the unit of analysis was shifted to the long term decision, the influ-
ence from environmental information decreased to a non-significant level. 
This result seems to be partly carried by a less reaction to the environ-
mental information from the experienced investors. Hence one interpreta-
tion is that the investors are displaying other decision behaviour in the 
long term than the novices. This is in line with the observed significant 
difference between investment allocation levels for the long term. Another 
interpretation could be that experienced investors have a different 
(shorter) investment horizon than the novices. This may provide an ex-
planation for the contrast between our findings and prior research which 
indicates that companies that disclose environmental information may be 
rewarded, at least when it comes to long term investments. The latter is 
only in accordance with our findings for novice investors. 
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The influence of supplementary and environmental information has been 
examined by previous capital market and experimental studies with mixed 
results. It is important to interpret the contributions of this study in that 
context. The difference in findings related to the individual decision mak-
ers (averaged decisions) and the findings related to the separate deci-
sions as units of analysis could suggest that mitigating factors are present 
in this study too.  
 
Mitigating factors considered explicit in the design of this study include 
the direction and type of environmental information, i.e., primarily posi-
tive environmental information presented in both qualitative and quantita-
tive form in the case material. Another factor relates to the relative im-
portance of a particular information item in light of the competition for the 
attention of the decision makers. The applied experimental design aims to 
eliminate (or at least reduce) a potential demand effect related to the 
particular nature of environmental information, i.e., by placing the in-
vestment allocation decision in a context of different types of decision 
relevant financial information items. The findings presented in this study 
suggest that the influence of environmental information on investment al-
location decisions is also mitigated by the variables considered explicitly 
in this study, i.e., the investment horizon (varied as short and long) and 
investor experience (varied as novice and experienced investor).  
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The limitations of this study are closely related to the experimental 
method. The strength is also the weakness. Setting up the case material 
introduces complexity while only a few factors can be examined simulta-
neously. The direction of environmental evidence can be negative, posi-
tive or mixed. Hence, absence of reaction to environmental information 
can be explained by lack of relative importance as compared to other in-
formational items of financial and non-financial nature. A reaction to envi-
ronmental information can be either positive (e.g. risk reduction conse-
quence) or negative (e.g. cost signal) in relation to the specific economic 
problem of the decision maker. The obvious conclusion is that because al-
location decisions are multifaceted problems, mixed results related to the 
influence of environmental information should be expected. 
 
The importance of distinguishing between different investment horizons 
and between different levels of experience suggests new venues for fur-
ther examination of the value of environmental information. Further stud-
ies could be aimed at the potential influence of environmental information 
on investment allocation decisions in the contexts of investment styles, 
investor types, information processing capabilities, decision aids and ex-
perience levels. Further studies could also benefit from examining differ-
ences between private and professional investors, i.e., identifying impor-
tant messages on both the potential applicability and appliance of re-
ported environmental information for investment allocation decision mak-
ing purposes.   42
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Figure 1: Disclosing Decision Relevant Information    48
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The difference between Beta and 
Gamma is explained by three cues:  
1) a recent ISO certification is 
mentioned in the company introduction,  
2) elaboration on environmental 
condition as part of statement on 
company affairs and  
3) a table with quantitative information 
on environmental issues 
See appendix 1 for a description of the actual cues used in the experiment. 
Table 1: Manipulations in the Research Design    49
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Between subjects 
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Table 3: Crosstabulation of Subjects Based on Age and Experience Group  
Age * Experience Group Crosstabulation 
Count 
1  46  47 
3  17  20 
7  0  7 
11  0  11 
7  0  7 
6  0  6 









Investor  Novice 
Experience group 





Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Ratio Allocated to the Second Company Across Investment Horizons, 





.4270  .25226  20 
.4467  .33989  15 
.4354  .28849  35 
.2563  .18689  30 
.3470  .25737  33 
.3038  .22936  63 
.3246  .22908  50 
.3781  .28582  48 
.3508  .25849  98 
.4400  .33935  20 
.6067  .32616  15 
.5114  .33935  35 
.4267  .24202  30 
.4848  .30733  33 
.4571  .27750  63 
.4320  .28171  50 
.5229  .31504  48 



























Ratio Second Long 
Ratio Second Short 
Mean  Std. deviation  N   52
 
Figure 2: Means for Ratio Invested in Company Without (Beta) and With (Gamma) Environmental 
Information by Investors in Short Term and Long Term 
 




































at Experience group = Investor 
Estimated Marginal Means of Ratio 
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Figure 3: Means for Ratio Invested in Company Without (Beta) and With (Gamma) Environmental 
Information by Novices in Short Term and Long Term 
 

































at Experience group = Novice 
Estimated Marginal Means of Ratio 
Long 
Short   54
 
 





Table 6: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects (Experience Group and Case Manipulation) 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: ratio 
.642  1  .642  9.197  .003 
.051  1  .051  .726  .396 
.036  1  .036  .521  .472 
.089  1  .089  1.279  .261 









Horizon * experience 
Horizon * case 
Horizon * experience  *  case 
Error(horizon) 
Type III sum 
of squares  df  Mean square  F  Sig. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: ratio 
Transformed variable: average 
32.723  1  32.723  394.671  .000 
.456  1  .456  5.500  .021 
.311  1  .311  3.757  .056 
.004  1  .004  .047  .829 





Experience * case 
Error 
Type III sum 
of squares  df  Mean Square  F  Sig.   55
 
  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 




squares  df  Mean square  F  Sig. 
Corrected model  .358(a)  3 .119 1.334 .268
Intercept  21.267  1 21.267 238.031 .000
Case  .280  1 .280 3.138 .080
Experience  .101  1 .101 1.134 .290
Case * experience  .065  1 .065 .731 .395
Error  8.398  94 .089    
Total  31.010  98      
Corrected total  8.756  97      
a  R squared = .041 (Adjusted R squared = .010) 
 
Table 7: ANOVA with Short Term Decision Measured by Ratio Second Short as Dependent Variable 
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Figure 4: Means for Short Term Ratio Invested in Company without (Beta) and with (Gamma) 
Environmental Information by Experience Group 






































Estimated Marginal Means of Ratio Second Short   57
 
Table 8: Importance of Information Sources for Short Term Decisions by Experience Group  
 
Group Statistics 
   Experience group  N  Mean  Std. deviation  Std. error mean  Sig. difference 
Info Short 9 months  Investor  34  4.118  1,066  0.183 
Novice  63  4.349  0.919  0.116 
Info Short Revenue  Investor  34  3.941  1.127  0.193 
Novice  63  3.905  0.911  0.115 
Info Short Income  Investor  34  4.559  0.991  0.170 
Novice  63  4.476  0.820  0.103 
Info Short Investment  Investor  34  3.324  1.224  0.210 
Novice  63  3.381  1.237  0.156 
Info Short Environment  Investor  34  2.824  1.242  0.213 
Novice  63  2.302  1.010  0.127 
Info Short Employees  Investor  34  2.971  1.267  0.217 
Novice  63  2.238  0.856  0.108 
Info Short Currency  Investor  34  3.118  1.225  0.210 
Novice  63  2.841  1.382  0.174 
Info Short Expectations  Investor  34  4.118  1.175  0.201 
Novice  63  3.444  1.305  0.164 
Info Short 5 years  Investor  34  3.588  1.328  0.228 
Novice  63  3.413  1.131  0.142 
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  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 




squares  df  Mean square  F  Sig. 
Corrected Model  .522(a)  3 .174 2.746 .047
Intercept  12.099  1 12.099 190.853 .000
Case  .067  1 .067 1.064 .305
Experience  .405  1 .405 6.395 .013
Case * experience  .028  1 .028 .441 .508
Error  5.959  94 .063    
Total  18.542  98      
Corrected Total  6.481  97      
a  R squared = .081 (Adjusted R squared = .051) 
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Figure 5: Means for Long Term Ratio Invested in Company Without (Beta) and With (Gamma) 









































Estimated Marginal Means of Ratio Second Long   60
 





   Experience group  N  Mean  Std. deviation  Std. error mean  Sig. difference 
Info Long 9 months  Investor  34  3.794  0.845  0.145 
Novice  63  3.762  0.893  0.112 
Info Long Revenue  Investor  34  3.853  1.132  0.194 
Novice  63  3.524  0.965  0.122 
Info Long Income  Investor  34  4.441  0.613  0.105 
Novice  63  4.190  0.840  0.106 
Info Long Investment  Investor  33  3.758  0.792  0.138 
Novice  63  4.365  0.885  0.112 
Info Long Environment  Investor  33  3.152  1.064  0.185 
Novice  63  2.873  1.143  0.144 
Info Long Employees  Investor  34  3.147  1.184  0.203 
Novice  63  2.683  1.090  0.137 
Info Long Currency  Investor  34  3.118  1.008  0.173 
Novice  63  2.746  1.031  0.130 
Info Long Expectations  Investor  34  4.206  1.038  0.178 
Novice  63  4.492  0.878  0.111 
Info Long 5 years  Investor  34  4.088  1.138  0.195 
Novice  63  4.143  1.060  0.134 
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short term  Sufficiency
Info Long 9 months  3.91 3.95 3.52 3.87 4.40 3.70 
Info  Revenue  3.91 3.90 3.67 3.47 4.07 3.50 
Info  Income  4.55 4.38 3.52 4.17 4.50 3.47 
Info  Investment  3.76 3.24 3.10 4.40 3.20 2.83 
Info  Environment  3.33 2.86 2.90 2.77 2.40 2.97 
Info  Employees  3.45 3.24 3.05 2.60 2.30 3.00 
Info  Currency  3.18 3.14 3.10 2.60 2.70 2.93 
Info  Expectations  4.09 3.86 3.05 4.60 3.33 2.77 
Info  5 years  4.18 3.71 3.62 4.10 3.40 3.53 
 Panel A: Importance and Sufficiency for the Alpha-Beta Allocation Decision    
                    









short term  Sufficiency
Info 9 months  3.87 4.47 3.53 3.67 4.30 3.45 
Info  Revenue  3.93 4.07 3.27 3.58 3.76 3.24 
Info  Income  4.40 4.80 3.60 4.21 4.45 3.09 
Info  Investment  3.87 3.60 3.47 4.33 3.55 3.00 
Info  Environment  2.93 2.87 3.27 2.97 2.21 3.30 
Info  Employees  2.87 2.80 3.27 2.76 2.18 3.03 
Info  Currency  3.13 3.20 3.07 2.88 2.97 2.88 
Info  Expectations  4.40 4.47 3.53 4.39 3.55 2.91 
Info  5 years  4.07 3.47 3.60 4.18 3.42 3.21 
Panel B: Importance and Sufficiency for the Alpha-Gamma Allocation Decision   
Table 11: Means for Importance and Sufficiency of Information Sources for Investment Allocation 
Decisions 
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Appendix 1: Environmental Information Included in the Information Material 
 
  Company 1   Company 2 
Introduction  Alpha: The production constantly works to 
minimize the environmental impact of the 
company and is also presently implementing 
environmental management in accordance with 
the ISO 14001 Standard.       
Beta: The company mission is to supply high-quality plastic products at 
low prices and with a high degree of environmental consideration. 
 
Gamma: The company mission is to supply high-quality plastic products at 
low prices and with a high degree of environmental consideration. The 
development continues and the environmental management system of the 




Alpha: No major investments related to 
environmental issues are foreseen for the 
immediate future.  
 
Beta: The following environmental policy is pursued in order to minimize 
the environmental impact: ”In order to ensure compliance with the laws 
and regulatory requirements, Company Beta has listed a number of target 
areas involving health and safety as well as the external environment.” 
Gamma: For many years Gamma Ltd. has worked on reducing production-
related environmental impact. We continuously focus on creating 
shareholder value, but when doing so, we also focus on complying with the 
company’s environmental policy and the laws and regulations in force.  
Within the past five years we have invested in a smoke filtration system 
and implemented a number of health and safety improvements. We are 
proud to announce that our environmental management system was 
certified according to the ISO 14001 Standard last year. The 
implementation of the environmental management system has been an 
important initiative that has involved employees in all parts of the 
company. The environmental management system consists of an 
environmental policy, targets for our environmental initiatives and an audit 
system to ensure that the company lives up to its targets. Our target areas 
for the coming year are: reduction of airborne emissions, increased noise 
control and the carrying out of environmental audits in all production units.  
Gamma Ltd. encourages the active participation of all employees in the 
environmental work and also for the next period it will ensure that 
adequate resources are available for reaching the company’s targets for 




Alpha: No  Beta: No 
Gamma: Yes (see appendix 2)   63
 
 
Appendix 2: Quantitative Environmental Information 
Environmental impact  Target 2003/04  2002/03  2001/02  2000/01 
Resource consumption       
Raw materials   131,300 ton  129,332 ton  134,234 ton  123,323 ton 
Electricity   114,000 MWh  119,345 MWh  123,287 MWh  126,987 MWh 
Heating oil  54,000 litres  53,878 litres 53,343  litres 52,345  litres 
Emissions      
CO2 emission  92,200 ton  95,465 ton  98,629 ton  101,589 ton 
Heavy metals  0.1 ton  1.2 ton  1.4 ton  1.8 ton 
Reusable waste  12.0 ton  10.0 ton  9.0 ton  10.0 ton 
Waste to landfill  1,200 ton  1,189 ton  1,467 ton  1,562 ton 
Other      
Environmental costs (DKK)  21 million  18 million  14 million  7 million 
Non-compliance  incidents  0 0 1 2 
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